Conference Agenda

We conduct an online donation dictator game experiment with over 1,300 participants, representative of the Japanese population, to investigate the relationship between the incentive scheme and prosocial behavior by systematically varying the stake size and probability of being paid, including those where the expected payments are controlled. We find that stake size is the main driver of donation decisions, even in the hypothetical scenario. Our result suggests that paying a large amount to a few participants incentivizes donation decisions better than paying a small amount to many in large-scale online experiments.

We analyse data from a repeated public good experiment where the decisions are taken by two groups (teams) of three participants. In a modified 2x3 design, we juxtapose games where both groups give to a joint project, both groups take from a joint project, or one group gives and the other group takes. In addition, we either nudge groups to cooperate by a normative appeal message in round 1 and round 5 of the repeated game, or we do not present such a nudge. We presume that both the opposing action space and the nudge increase the salience of group identity. Indeed, we find that groups decide more effectively when group identity is more salient. They exchange less messages and need less time to come to a decision when they play against another group that has an opposite action space or when being nudged. Thus, our work highlights the value in researching group identity as potential lever to speed-up group decision-making and improve environmental policies.

Information represents the “third wave” of environmental policy. Existing evidence shows consumers increase their willingness to pay (WTP) for environmentally friendly products with clear labelling. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding whether consumers have a willingness to engage (WTE) with detailed information, for example, through a Digital Product Passport (DPP). This technological innovation is part of the European Union’s new circular economy action plan. In our theoretical model, a green consumer decides whether to invest in information on how to mitigate their environmental damage, but at a cognitive cost. We test the model in a lab experiment selling an environmentally friendly toothbrush, but information about its environmental credentials is only available through a DPP. We find education on the DPP’s purpose is key to increasing revealed WTE when a DPP is available. Participants with a high stated WTE engage with the DPP regardless; the increase in revealed WTE comes from those with a lower stated WTE. Engagement with the DPP, in the case that it contains positive environmental information, increases WTP. The policy implications of our results are that education about the purpose of the DPP is required in order to increase the likelihood of actual consumer engagement with it, as long as it is user friendly. However, engagement with a DPP may not lead to further shifts in environmental orientation and behavior. Our study also demonstrates novel measures of WTE, and how these can be used to understand pro-environmental consumer behavior in a theoretically informed manner.

Hassle costs, a form of non-monetary transaction costs, are often cited as barriers to the adoption of government programs and new technologies. Despite their potential economic significance, hassle costs lack formal definitions, precise quantifications, and empirical evaluations of interventions designed to address them. This paper introduces the concept of marginal hassle cost (MHC)---the opportunity cost of time required to complete burdensome administrative tasks. We propose an experimental procedure to elicit the MHC and validate the approach through a large-scale field experiment on heat pump adoption in Kelowna, Canada. We find that the average MHC aligns with the wage rate, but substantial heterogeneity exists across individuals, with a weak correlation between MHC and wage rate. Additionally, human-assisted tasks are perceived as costlier than computer-assisted ones. Total hassle costs in the context of heat pump adoption are economically significant and correlate with lower ex-ante returns on investment in heat pumps, suggesting that hassle costs disproportionately deter adopters for which subsidies have the highest marginal value of public funds.