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Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 10th Sept 2026, 07:06:36pm CEST (Norway)

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Daily Overview

Session

Green preferences and public goods
Location: Auditorium L: Ingrid Simonnæs
Session Chair: Alina Sowa, University of Bonn

Presentation 1

The Ratchet Effect and Its Amendments in Threshold Public Good Provision: An Experimental Investigation

Zhi Li¹, Yun Hong¹, Jie Zheng²

1: Xiamen University, China, People's Republic of; 2: Shandong University, China, People's Republic of

Discussant: Lana Friesen (University of Queensland)

The Paris Agreement includes a ratchet-up mechanism designed to accelerate the progress towards long-term climate goals by prescribing that parties' commitments to climate change cannot decrease over time. However, this mechanism often leads to reduced early contributions to avoid high obligations later on, known as the ratchet effect. We experimentally investigate this effect in a threshold public good game and test two amendments: the strong ratchet-up mechanism (SR) and the collective minimum contribution mechanism (CMC), with the former requiring strictly increasing contributions and the latter a collectively chosen minimum. Our experiment supports a significant ratchet effect in the weak ratchet-up mechanism. Subjects reduce their contributions initially, but the increasing contributions over the course of the game are insufficient to offset the early drop, leading to a lower provision rate. The SR mechanism also suffers initial low contributions but recovers faster, effectively compensating the initial drop. The CMC mechanism mitigates the ratchet effect by boosting contributions at the beginning of the game, especially when the minimum contributions are binding. However, both the SR and CMC mechanisms lower individual willingness to contribute. Balancing these conflicting incentives is crucial for an effective climate policy design.