Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Social norms and climate policies Location: Auditorium I Session Chair: Guillaume Cheikbossian, Université de Montpellier, CEE-M | |
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Indirect and direct lobbying on international trade in waste 1: Université de Montpellier, CEE-M, France; 2: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute This paper investigates the effects of environmental lobbying on international trade in waste. We first develop a direct lobbying framework à la Grossman and Helpman (1994) that emphasizes the potential impact of green lobbies on the environmental policy and how North-to-South waste flows are affected through this policy channel. We show that the politically chosen policies are ambiguous relative to the socially optimal levels, depending on the heterogeneity of environmental preferences and the degree of pollution damages from waste. This in turn leads to ambiguous effects of environmental lobbying on the North-to-South waste trade. Further, we build an indirect lobbying model based on Yu (2005) to analyze the impact of indirect lobbying through public persuasion by interest groups on environmental policy stringency, political contributions and waste exports. We show that strengthening green lobbying induces the substitution of direct and indirect competition from both lobby groups if and only if when the size of the capitalists and the waste-induced pollution damages are small enough. In this case, environmental lobbies are less aggressive indirectly but behave more aggressively directly, while the converse holds for the capitalist lobbies. This leads to a more stringent environmental policy and more waste to be exported. Surprisingly, we also find that an increase in the waste disposal fee in the South leads to more competition both directly and indirectly. | |