Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Policy tools for public goods provision Location: Auditorium N: Agnar Sandmo Session Chair: Stefanie Schmitt, University of Bamberg | |
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The Political Economy of “Non-Use” Rights for Conserving Natural Resources 1: Arizona State University; 2: UC Santa Barbara; 3: University of Wyoming This paper characterizes how the combination of top-down (regulatory) and bottom-up (voluntary) approaches to curbing externalities can affect welfare when both are imperfect. On the one hand, private provision of many public goods is quite common but likely far short of efficient. On the other hand, there is reason to doubt that existing price and quantity instruments are calibrated optimally. Given the coexistence of these contrasting approaches, under what conditions does allowing private provision of public goods on top of regulatory instruments improve welfare? The traditional comparison of top-down price and quantity instruments assumes no voluntary reductions in externality-generating behaviors, but recent research demonstrates that such voluntary reductions change the characterization of efficient regulatory prices and quantities. We build on this framework and characterize the welfare implications of various combinations of price instruments, quantity instruments, and voluntary provision. We find that allowing private parties to pursue voluntary reductions increases welfare except in the presence of a relatively stringent Pigouvian tax. | |