Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Air pollution 4 Location: Auditorium N: Agnar Sandmo Session Chair: Shreekant Gupta, University of Delhi | |
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Discretionary Enforcement and Strategic Compliance: Experimental Evidence 1: Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University; 2: Centre for Social and Economic Progress; 3: LKY School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore We conduct an experimental analysis of the strategic elements of the inspection-compliance game (e.g. between firms and environmental enforcement agencies). We extend the seminal binary-choice (2×2) inspection-compliance game played between an environmental enforcement agency and a firm to a 3 × 3 game in which both players have additional choices. We conducted the experiment (120 rounds) with 164 participants in three countries (India, Singapore and Kazakhstan). In our model, the Agency strategizes over the frequency and quality of inspections and the Firm strategizes over compliance behavior, by investing in non-inspectability in order to deter any inspection or getting caught by the Agency. The results from our laboratory evidence indicate that availability of strategic non-compliance options reduces overall level of compliance by the firms but increases total inspection although approximately one third of those inspections are just cursory. | |