Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Norms and preferences Location: Auditorium N: Agnar Sandmo Session Chair: Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Duke University | |
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Subsidizing Compliance: A field experiment on discounted sustainable fishing gear at Lake Victoria 1: Heidelberg University, Germany; 2: University of Augsburg, Germany; 3: Stockholm University, Sweden; 4: ZEW, Leibniz Institute for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany; 5: Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute, Mwanza, Tanzania; 6: Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute, Kisumu. Kenya Monitoring and punishment are common tools for increasing the cost of non-compliance. In developing country contexts, however, these tools are often ineffective or inefficient. We investigate an alternative approach: Subsidies that reduce the cost of compliance. We conduct a randomized controlled trial with 799 boat owners at Lake Victoria, Kenya and Tanzania, clustered at the level of landing sites. We offer compliant fishing net panels for sale and investigate the effect of discounts on the purchase and use of non-compliant panels. We test the impact of the subsidy under a regime with enforcement (Tanzania) and without enforcement (Kenya). We find that a discount of US\$10 on compliant panels crowds out an average of 1.5 non-compliant panels. The effect is higher in the absence of enforcement (1.5 panels) than in the presence of enforcement (half a panel). Second, when offered a second time (3 months later) the subsidy treatment significantly increases the likelihood of purchase, suggesting that subsidies can lead to sustained reductions in non-compliance and this effect is particularly pronounced under enforcement. | |