Conference Agenda

Assigning property rights to fish stocks has become the preferred way for regulators to increase cost-effectiveness of harvest across a growing number of fisheries. In many catch share programs, transfers of catch privileges in some form take place, resulting in the formation of prices. Catch share prices can convey important information to fisheries managers and participating fishers. Although all major fisheries in Norway are managed with a catch share system, information about prices is not publicly available, and little research has been conducted on catch share valuation in Norway and elsewhere. For our study, we use a hedonic framework to estimate the marginal value of individual vessel quota units (IVQ) in the northern coastal fishery for cod, the most economically important fishery in Norway. Using Norwegian tax data on registered fishers and fishing firms, together with data on vessel ownership, we construct a comprehensive transaction database spanning the years 2009 to 2017. We use this novel data set to estimate hedonic pricing models at the vessel level, allowing us to estimate implicit prices of quota units. We use our hedonic pricing models to investigate how regulatory limits on vessel-level consolidation of quota units affect their marginal value. Further, we assess how geographic restrictions on trade affect the valuation of the quota and find, in line with economic theory, that fewer restrictions increases supply and reduces the marginal value of cod quota. Our study thus highlights the importance of considering all aspects of the regulatory framework.