Conference Agenda

In this paper we investigate distributional aspects of the economically optimal harvest and profit using the Greenland halibut fishery at the west coast of Greenland as an empirical case. We depart from a theoretical model with two fleet segments (high sea and coastal vessels), and we introduce an exogenous equity weight on the coastal profit in an objective function. The equity weight is assumed to a larger than or equal to one and capture that the coastal profit have the same or a higher weight in a welfare function than the high sea profit. We do not have data for estimating the exogenous equity weight so we consider the implications of increasing the weight. Regarding the stock size of Grl. halibut we consider two alternative assumptions: (a) One common fish stock; and (b) Separate high sea and coastal fish stocks. For (a) the optimal coastal harvest and profit are significantly higher than the high sea harvest and profit with an equity weight on one. Furthermore, the optimal high sea harvest and profit become zero for a small increase in the equity weight. Under (b) the optimal high sea harvest and profit is higher than the coastal harvest and profit with an equity weight on one. In addition, the optimal high sea and coastal harvest and profit remains almost unchanged when increasing the equity weight.

In commercial fisheries, the fishing decisions of a vessel are never really independent of the other vessels' decisions. Congestive externalities on fishing sites impact a vessel's behavior and create additional operation costs, while short-term stock effects, whereby fish stocks are locally depleted by a vessel, force other vessels to search further for …sh. We show that this essential trait of the fishing process explains the old and universal practice of crew partnerships, also known as 'lays.' In this framework adopting a profit-sharing or a catch-sharing partnership with the crew is a unique equilibrium for the vessel owner. Three important features arise. First, crew partnership share increases with the magnitude of externalities. Second, fishing e¤ort (and hence fish mortality) can increase when the cost of fishing operations due to congestion increases and finally, the robustness of this equilibrium arises from harvest uncertainty; a basic feature of fishing activities. Compared to fisheries with regular wages, partnerships result in larger harvests but often lead to lower vessel

profits. We discuss the possibility of regulating the lay system. Partnerships also impact fisheries regulated with Individual Trading Quotas. We show that such contracts create opportunities for vessels to manipulate ITQs' lease price and degrade the allocative efficiency of ITQs.

Motivated by recent discussions about the issue of risk perceptions for climate change related events, we introduce a non-cooperative game setting where agents manage a common pool resource under a potential risk, and agents exhibit different risk perceptions. We first highlight that risk and risk perceptions have qualitatively differing impacts on optimal decisions. Then, focusing on the effect of the polarization level and other population features, we show that the type of perception (overestimation, underestimation) and the pre- and post-shift resource quality levels have first-order importance on the qualitative nature of behavioral adjustments and on resource conservation. When there are heterogeneous perceptions within the population, the intra-group structure qualitatively affects the degree of resource conservation. Moreover, science-based agents (using the probability estimate making consensus within the scientific community) may react in non-monotone ways to changes in the polarization level. The size of the science-based agents’ sub-population does not qualitatively affect how an increase in the polarization level impacts behavioral adjustments, even though it affects the magnitude of this change. Finally, it is shown how risk perceptions affect the comparison between centralized and decentralized management, and several policies are discussed based on their likely effects on welfare.

Managing natural resources by enforcing output quotas or by installing property rights is costly, challenging, and requires strong state capacity. In many developing economies, the only formal policies to avert the tragedy of the commons are input regulations. Consequently, compliance with input controls is a key concern for policy makers. This paper studies subsidies for nets with legal mesh size as a tool to promote compliance with gear regulations in an open-access fishery. I develop a stylized size-structured model to show when a subsidy improves outcomes despite encouraging entry.