Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Session Overview |
Session | |||
7A: Corporate Governance II
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Presentations | |||
2:45pm - 3:15pm
An American in Paris: US Directors’ Foreign Board Experience and Corporate Internationalization Policy 1emlyon business school, France; 2KEDGE Business School, France; 3University of Groningen, The Netherlands By bisecting the US directors’ foreign board experience between English-origin “common law” versus continental “code law” countries in 31,777 firm-year observations from 4,053 US-listed firms between 2003-2015, we document that foreign board experience in code law countries is negatively associated with corporate internationalization levels but not experience in common law countries. Several types of robustness tests validate these results. We also examined the board mechanisms (i.e., executive directors versus non-executive directors) that drive these results and the consequences of reduced internationalization levels for the firm’s operational risk-taking and management policies, such as cash holdings, investments, and payout policies.
3:15pm - 3:45pm
Enforcing Shareholder Voice Creates Value: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design 1HAN University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands; 2Wallex, Iran This paper investigates whether a recent provision of the UK Corporate Governance
3:45pm - 4:15pm
The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to ESG Performance 1Hanken School of Economics, Finland; 2Arizona State University, USA This paper investigates sensitivities of CEO pay to ESG performance for Chief Executive Officers of S&P 1500 companies from 2006 through 2020. We find that pay-for-ESG-performance elasticities are small and not economically significance. Second, the pay-for-ESG-performance elasticity is stronger for CEOs with conditional (predicted) compensation lower than the sample average. Third, the pay-for-ESG-performance elasticity for companies in industry with significant environmental footprint is also small and of no economic significance. Last, the pay-for-ESG-performance relation has declined following the passage of the say on pay law. Overall, our results are more consistent with the public relation view of ESG pay.
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