Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

 
 
Session Overview
Session
7A: Corporate Governance II
Time:
Friday, 13/Sept/2024:
2:45pm - 4:15pm

Session Chair: Dr. Jeremie BERTRAND, IESEG School of Management
Location: HOGM 00.85

Faculty of Economics and Business Hogeheuvelcollege Naamsestraat 69 , 3000 Leuven

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Presentations
2:45pm - 3:15pm

An American in Paris: US Directors’ Foreign Board Experience and Corporate Internationalization Policy

Shibashish Mukherjee1, Nassima Selmane2, Niels Hermes3

1emlyon business school, France; 2KEDGE Business School, France; 3University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Discussant: Aksel Mjøs (NHH Norwegian School of Economics)

By bisecting the US directors’ foreign board experience between English-origin “common law” versus continental “code law” countries in 31,777 firm-year observations from 4,053 US-listed firms between 2003-2015, we document that foreign board experience in code law countries is negatively associated with corporate internationalization levels but not experience in common law countries. Several types of robustness tests validate these results. We also examined the board mechanisms (i.e., executive directors versus non-executive directors) that drive these results and the consequences of reduced internationalization levels for the firm’s operational risk-taking and management policies, such as cash holdings, investments, and payout policies.

Mukherjee-An American in Paris-125.pdf


3:15pm - 3:45pm

Enforcing Shareholder Voice Creates Value: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

Mohsen Ghanadzadeh1, Ahmad Asadi Kangarshahi2

1HAN University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands; 2Wallex, Iran

Discussant: Luis Antonio Gioia Ettore (Tilburg University and University of Sao Paulo)

This paper investigates whether a recent provision of the UK Corporate Governance
Code, forcing management to communicate with shareholders after bad voting results,
creates value. I use a Regression Discontinuity Design on shareholder vote outcomes to
analyze the stock price reaction to a significant shareholder dissent on the meeting day.
Using voting data collected for UK listed firms, I show that companies for which the
minimum approval rate among all ballot items falls slightly below the 80% threshold
realize roughly 2.7% more positive abnormal returns on the meeting day than those
for which the minimum approval rate falls marginally above this threshold.

Ghanadzadeh-Enforcing Shareholder Voice Creates Value-169.pdf


3:45pm - 4:15pm

The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to ESG Performance

Kam-Ming Wan1, Thomas Bates2

1Hanken School of Economics, Finland; 2Arizona State University, USA

Discussant: Roberto Mura (University of Manchester)

This paper investigates sensitivities of CEO pay to ESG performance for Chief Executive Officers of S&P 1500 companies from 2006 through 2020. We find that pay-for-ESG-performance elasticities are small and not economically significance. Second, the pay-for-ESG-performance elasticity is stronger for CEOs with conditional (predicted) compensation lower than the sample average. Third, the pay-for-ESG-performance elasticity for companies in industry with significant environmental footprint is also small and of no economic significance. Last, the pay-for-ESG-performance relation has declined following the passage of the say on pay law. Overall, our results are more consistent with the public relation view of ESG pay.

Wan-The Sensitivity of CEO Pay to ESG Performance-144.pdf