We examine the joint effects of shareholder engagement—coordinated as part of the Climate Action 100+ (CA100+) initiative—and governmental climate regulation on firms’ carbon emissions intensity. Our theory and findings support the standalone effects of firms’ voluntary responses to investor pressure and mandatory pressure from climate regulation. Notably, we find that these two forms of pressure are complementary, with firms facing both shareholder engagement and regulatory pressure reducing their subsequent emissions intensity on average. Furthermore, we test and find supportive evidence for spillover effects arising from board ties between firms targeted by CA100+ and connected non-targeted firms, which are likewise reinforced by the prevalence of government climate regulatory pressures. By demonstrating the additive effects of these different sources of pressure on firms’ environmental impacts, we contribute to the corporate governance and stakeholder literatures, while also recognizing the complexity of normative pressures and interrelationships between actors that are key contributors to climate-related challenges and solutions.

We present novel evidence on how environmental and social (E&S) incidents affect the capital-raising ability of Private Equity (PE) firms. PE firms with E&S incidents in portfolio companies are less likely to fundraise and raise smaller subsequent funds. The decrease in capital commitment does not seem related to fund performance; instead, it is driven by E&S concerns of relationship limited partners (LPs). LPs trade off E&S concerns with financial cost of breaking relationships, implying a weaker impact on large, top-performing PE firms. The threat of “exit” by E&S-concerned investors incentivizes PE firms to exert “voice” and mitigate negative E&S externalities.

This paper examines the impact of immigrant entrepreneurship status and political clientelism on attracting attention from state legislators—key public resource providers. We conduct a field experiment with 6,734 state legislators across the US. Each legislator received an email with identical content from an entrepreneur asking for help with hiring. We randomized entrepreneurs’ immigrant status (1st or 3rd Generation American) and political constituency (inside or outside the legislator’s constituency). Thus, each legislator was randomly assigned to one of the four arms: (a) Arm 1: 3rd Generation American Inside Legislator Constituency, (b) Arm 2: 3rd Generation American Outside Legislator Constituency, (c) Arm 3: 1st Generation American Inside Legislator Constituency, (d) Arm 4: 1st Generation American Outside Legislator Constituency. We find that legislators allocate their attention unequally: reply rates for immigrant entrepreneurs (1st Generation American) are substantially lower than for nonimmigrant entrepreneurs (3rd Generation American). Importantly, we find that the difference between legislator reply rates for immigrant and nonimmigrant entrepreneurs is higher within the legislators’ constituency but negligible outside it. The relative difference is larger for Republican legislators and smaller in states with more immigrant eligible voters. State’s startup job creation, immigrant educational attainment, and racial composition influence the relative differential.